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Abstract 
The government of China has decided to privatize many state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Is it wise to consider investing in these SOEs?  What is the level of installed technology, 
from traditional production planning systems, like MRP, to robotics?  How different are 
SOEs from privately owned firms, joint ventures, and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries?  
This paper attempts to answer these questions based on a survey of 120 manufacturing 
firms in the Shanghai area.  We report on the status of, and future plans for, 
manufacturing technology implementation; and we discuss other improvement initiatives. 
We report on significant differences among ownership types, and yet we discover that the 




1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
China continues to capture the imagination.  In spite of the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s, changing policies toward state-owned enterprises, and the presence of a global slowdown, 
business in China has not taken the beating that many expected.  Global firms have maintained 
their strong interest in China, both as a source of products and components, and as a strategic 
location for operations.  Yet the distance between the West and China, both geographically and 
culturally, is huge.  Managers in the West do not, as a rule, understand the intricacies of doing 
business in China.  And the business press can only be of limited help.   
This research is designed to help managers and researchers understand several important 
dimensions of Chinese manufacturing firms.  In particular, we are interested in discovering how 
advanced these firms are with regard to manufacturing technologies, labour relations, and other 
key improvement actions.  We address the issue of ownership structure to find out whether 
foreign participation is a significant determinant of financial performance or of technology 
implementation.  We also examine whether firm size is a better explanatory variable than 
ownership structure.  Our findings have implications for researchers in that we discover little 
explanatory power due to firm size, and in fact, we find many issues for which the differences 
among ownership types are insignificant.  However, we do discover some significant differences, 
which may provide useful insights for managers seeking to expand business into China, either by 
acquisition, partnership or subcontracting. 
 In a previous paper, Pyke, Robb, & Farley (2000), we reviewed much of the relevant 
literature on manufacturing and supply chain management in China.  Here, we discuss other 
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research specifically relevant to the issues addressed in this paper, and we highlight new research 
since our last paper was written.   
 
Ownership Structure the Chinese Economy 
Clarke & Du (1998) describe the various ownerships structures of Chinese firms.  They provide 
data on output, numbers of firms, and other important factors, for state owned enterprises 
(SOEs), collectively owned enterprises (COEs), privately owned firms (POEs), and others.  They 
also outline a brief history of these ownership structures.  Kynge (2000) notes that about half of 
all firms that call themselves collectives should be relabeled as private. 
Transition (2001) summarizes key data on state-owned enterprises and those from the 
nonstate sector, including private firms.  SOEs accounted for 77.6 percent of industrial output in 
1978, but only 26.5 percent in 1998.  Privately held firms accounted for only 1.9 percent in 1985, 
but increased to 16.0 percent in 1998.  At the same time, employment in SOEs fell from 112.6 
million in 1996 to an estimated 81.2 million in 1999.  Researchers estimate that many laid off 
workers from SOEs found jobs in the private sector – as many as 4,000 workers per day in 1999.  
Employment in the private sector rose from 4.5 million in 1985 to an estimated 81.3 million in 
1999. 
 Along the same lines, Koretz (2001) reports that China’s private sector accounts for over 
75% of the country’s output, and these private companies’ earnings have been growing rapidly 
since July 2000.  The cause?  At least in part, this growth is due to foreign direct investment.  
Also, the private sector is now more reliant on stock offerings than on bank debt as a source of 
capital.  In addition, observers note a surge in mergers and acquisitions (Roberts & Webb 
(2001)).  In some cases, SOEs are taking over other SOEs; but in general there is a large upswing 
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in M&A activity of all sorts.  Roberts & Webb (2001) note that the number of M&As was 
expected to grow by 40% in 2001, to a total deal flow of $40 billion.  Earlier, Kynge (2000) 
reported on a study by the International Finance Corp., an arm of the World Bank, that private 
firms in China generated 33% of GDP in 1998 compared to 37% from SOEs.  The growth due to 
private firms appears to be phenomenal.   
The vast majority of the growth in manufacturing enterprises and employment is in urban 
areas, causing what some term the “great migration” from the countryside to cities.  As a result, 
social problems abound (Roberts (2000)).  A survey on China by The Economist, "China: Now 
comes the hard part" (2000), highlights some of these issues and discusses the issues related to 
transforming China to a market economy.  Ngai (1999) focuses on a particular dimension of the 
great migration – that of the working girls who have left farm lands for urban jobs.  Manhua 
(2001) provides recommendations for improving the situation in rural areas.  These include 
increasing urbanization so that more people can find jobs in manufacturing and other enterprises.  
A further problem that may drive considerable social unrest in the future is increasing inequality 
within each city.  Private firms could play a central role in mitigating such problems.   
 Fulin (2001) addresses the challenge that WTO membership will present to China.  In 
addition to discussion of social policy reform and agriculture reform, the article recommends 
separating government from enterprises by converting large and medium-sized manufacturing 
enterprises into joint stock companies.  Furthermore, Fulin recommends eliminating institutional 
barriers and increasing legal protection for private enterprises, including for private property, as 
well as increasing financial support of private enterprises. 
Kouvelis, Axaraloglou, & Sinha (2001) examine exchange rates and the choice of 
ownership structure using both an analytical model and empirical data of firms from many 
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countries.  They demonstrate how exchange rates and switching costs would lead a firm to 
choose a JV or wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) over an exporting strategy, and to 
specify choice of either a JV or a WOFS.  For instance, depreciated real exchange rates (i.e. a 
weak home currency) tend to favor a JV over a WOFS, and an exporting strategy over both a 
WOFS and a JV.  Our own observations – of the increasing popularity of WOFSs and of China’s 
maintenance (even against most pundits) of the RMB/USD rate – confirm these results.   
Child & Yan (2001) study joint ventures (JVs) in China and discuss the “nationality” and 
“transnationality” effects on management.  They discover a very limited nationality effect; in 
other words, there are few differences in strategic orientation, training, management controls, 
and other management dimensions among the multiple countries from which the JV partners 
originate.  However, they do find several significant transnational effects, where a transnational 
firm is defined as one that has manufacturing in two or more continents and worldwide sourcing 
or distribution.  Examining the differences between transnational firms and non-transnational 
firms, the authors find differences on a number of dimensions. The implication is that JVs with 
transnational firms, as opposed to national firms, are more likely to lead to transfer of 
management practices into China.  We should note, however, that Child & Yan (2001) assert that 
ownership is only one of many methods of measuring foreign involvement.  Others include, for 
example, management and board appointments.   
Robb & Xie (2001) survey foreign-invested and Chinese-owned enterprises in the 
Beijing-Tianjin area.  They examine current manufacturing practices, differences between the 




Advanced Manufacturing Technologies in China 
 
There is little research on advanced manufacturing technologies in China.  Anon (2000) 
notes that China plans to initiate computer aided design (CAD) or computer integrated 
manufacturing (CIM) technology in more than 90 percent of its large- and medium-sized state-
owned manufacturing firms by the end of 2010.  And Jiang, Wang, & Sun (1993) note that in a 
seven-year period, 1986-1993, only about ten flexible manufacturing systems were established in 
China.   
 De Meyer (2001) argues that overcapacity, a persistent problem in China today, means 
that China needs technology that leads to innovation and improvement, not the traditional 
turnkey factories employed by foreign firms.   
 The case study of Tseng, Ip, & Ng (1999) shows the benefit and appropriateness of a 
socio-technical approach (i.e., integrated manufacturing) in China, rather than the traditional 
labour intensive or high-tech, automated approaches. 
 
Empirical Research on Quality Management 
Li (2000) surveys 72 companies in China regarding marketing, product innovation, 
manufacturing, and human resource development.  He develops regression models to test the 
relationship between managers’ emphasis on competence in each of these areas with firm 
performance.  Human resource development had the strongest relationship with performance, 
although other areas, such as quality management (a subtopic under manufacturing), scored high 
as well. 
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 Lihong & Goffin (1999) interviewed six joint venture manufacturing firms in China and 
found that the main problem areas were recruiting and training employees, supplier management 
(especially delivery problems), quality output, and an effective business culture. 
Pu (1991) comments on the importance of Quality Control Circles, during the 1980s, in 
promoting product quality in China.  Later, a study of 212 manufacturers in Liaoning Province 
by Zhang, Waszink, & Wijngaard (2000) revealed that little empirical research had been 
conducted on implementation of total quality management (TQM) in Chinese manufacturing 
companies.  This study then concluded that most Chinese companies are trying to implement 
ISO 9000 in order to improve their quality systems.   
 A 1998 Survey of 71 Shanghai Manufacturers by Hua (2000) found that 62% of 
respondents had registered for ISO (9001-9002-9003); 23% had not registered for any ISO 9000 
certificate but were planning to register in next two years.  Interestingly, the study found ISO 
9000 certification did not correlate with quality management practice or performance, but that 
TQM practices were highly related to business performance (as measured by market share 
growth, profitability, lower costs, etc.). 
Chen & Fu (2001) show that adoption of information technology (PCs, for example) is 
not clearly connected with economic performance or with innovation.  However, they find that 
the size of the firm plays an important role in the IT adoption process.  As we shall see below, 
we find little evidence that size of firm is an important explanatory variable for manufacturing 
technology adoption. 
 Finally, we note that our previous paper, Pyke et al. (2000), studied SOEs, COEs and 
POEs in the Shanghai area with a focus on supply chain management and operations strategy.   
The current paper builds on this survey to include wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (WOFSs) 
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and joint ventures (JVs).  Because of some confusion regarding the identification of collectively 
owned enterprises (specifically privately owned firms may identify themselves as collectively 
owned), we have dropped them from the analysis in this paper.  Our focus is on advanced 
manufacturing technologies and other results not reported in the earlier paper. 
 
2.  Data Collection 
The questionnaire, sampling and interviewing procedures, measurement and development of 
summary scales were the same as those used in Pyke et al. (2000), except for 50 new interviews 
with joint ventures and wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries located in Shanghai.   
 
Questionnaire: The basis of the questionnaire was the framework for manufacturing strategy in 
Wheelwright (1984) and Pyke (1997).  The questionnaire used by Robb & Xie (2001), was 
complemented with questions from Hum & Leow (1996), Deshpande & Farley (1999a) and 
McDermott, Greis, & Fischer (1997).  The translated new items were added to the draft 
questionnaire.  Back-translations to English were used to assess translation accuracy and pre-
tests were done with senior manufacturing managers.  No problems – lack of clarity, sensitivity 
of the answers, etc. – were encountered in the earlier study.   
 
Sampling: The sample of firms was drawn from registers of businesses in Shanghai maintained 
by market research firms for their business-to-business projects. Interviewers reported that 85 
percent of the original sample was contacted and that 75 percent of these contacts produced 
useful interviews, yielding 50 new firms to add to the 100 firms interviewed in the earlier study.  
As noted above, some collectives were dropped from the sample, yielding a sample of 50 State-
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owned enterprises, 20 Privately owned enterprises, 24 JVs, and 26 WOFSs.  Industry 
representation is given in Table 1.   
 
Interviewing: In-office personal interviews with senior manufacturing executives were 
conducted in Chinese by the staff of an international market research firm who specialize in 
research in business-to-business settings, based on prior appointments made by telephone. 
 
Measurement: All items on the questionnaire were closed-ended.  They included three, five and 
seven-point scales as well as nominal qualitative measures and metric measures, such as number 
of employees. 
 
Construction of Summary Scales: A set of summary scales composed of multiple 7-point items 
measure both degree of emphasis on, and recent improvement in, the competitive objectives of 
cost, quality, delivery, flexibility in the new product development process, and flexibility in the 
production process.  The content and reliability of these ten scales are shown in Table 2.  In all 
but one case the reliability of the scales as measured by the Chronbach ∝  is above the minimum 
exploratory level of 0.6 (Nunally (1967).  The three elements of the performance scale, shown to 
be reliable in a wide variety of settings Deshpande & Farley (1999b), produced a reliability 
measure of 0.83.   
 
3.  Some General Results  
We asked about 160 questions on many dimensions of manufacturing strategy, operations 
performance, manufacturing structural and infrastructural decisions, improvement actions 
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currently and planned for the future, and new technologies.  The bulk of this paper will discuss 
technologies and improvement actions.  However, we begin with some comments on operations 
objectives, manufacturing strategy, manufacturing structural and infrastructural decisions, and 
supply chain issues.   
Perhaps the most striking observation is the lack of significant difference among 
ownership types.  None of the summary scales measuring the degree of emphasis on the 
competitive objectives were significantly different among firms.  Only one of the five scales that 
measured the degree of improvement on these objectives in the last year (improvement in cost 
performance) was significantly different among firms.  WOFSs and JVs scored higher than POEs 
and SOEs, with JVs being the highest and POEs the lowest.  Average scores on the seven point 
scale for JVs, WOFSs, SOEs and POEs were 5.54, 5.50, 4.76 and 4.20, respectively. 
One set of eight questions examined the strategic role of manufacturing in the firm, 
asking, for instance, whether competitive advantage is sought by having manufacturing 
participate in making marketing, engineering and business strategy decisions.  There was no 
significant difference among ownership types for any of these questions. 
Another set of 37 questions examined manufacturing structural and infrastructural 
decisions, including worker training, production equipment developed in house, level of work-
in-process inventory, supply chain management, and many others.  Only 7 of the 37 questions 
showed a significant difference, and four of these pertained to technologies.  We will discuss 
these results in the context of advanced manufacturing technologies in Section 4.  Two of the 
remaining three questions had to do with worker skill and responsibilities, a topic we address in 
Section 5.  The final significant result pertained to supplier involvement in new product 
development.   
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Therefore, we can conclude that on most dimensions the expected differences among 
ownership types are simply not evident in the data.  The Western business press has continually 
reported that SOEs are in fact very different (see Roberts & Webb (2001), Roberts, Prasso, & 
Clifford (1999), The Economist "Infatuation's end" (1999), Broadman (1999), and Steinfeld 
(1998) for example), and that the vast majority of SOEs are being required to survive without 
government assistance or face new ownership structures.  Our data do not support the first part 
of that statement.  On the other hand, we do see a clear and consistent pattern of differences on 
new technologies, both in terms of the firms’ current status and their future plans.  And we see 
differences in financial performance.  This latter result has been widely reported, and our results 
support it.     
  
3.1 Other general results 
Statistics regarding size of workforce are interesting.  We measured the number of operators 
currently, the number of total employees currently, and the number of total employees five years 
ago.  SOEs are by far the largest and were the largest five years ago.  This is of course not 
surprising.  POEs, on average, have not changed in size.  (All SOEs and POEs surveyed were in 
existence five years ago.)  JVs and WOFSs, most of which existed five years ago, have gotten 
much larger, while SOEs have cut more than 700 workers on average.  The average number of 
operators currently for SOEs, POEs, JVs, and WOFSs, are 799.94, 138.65, 312.08, and 285.62, 
respectively.  These numbers are significantly different at the 0.008 level.   The results for the 
total number of employees currently are 1322.10, 249.85, 608.50, and 564.42, respectively, 
(significantly different at the 0.006 level).   Total employees five years ago:  2094.80, 248.30, 
320.04, and 335.88, respectively, (significantly different at the 0.000 level).  The current 
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averages for JVs change very slightly if we remove firms that didn’t exist five years ago, while 
those for WOFSs are about 20% larger. 
 
3.2 Financial Performance 
 
Looking at the financial measures of improvement in market share, profitability, and return on 
sales, we find no significant difference among the ownership types on market share.  However, 
WOFSs reported significantly higher improvement in profitability.  We measured the difference 
between the mean of each ownership type and the overall mean.  WOFSs scored 0.283, which is 
significant at the 0.002 level.  POEs and SOEs were significantly lower, with scores 
(significance level) of –0.181 (0.048) and –0.217 (0.017), respectively.  JVs were 0.143 higher 
than the mean, but only at the 0.118 level.  Results for improvement in return on sales were 
significant for all four ownership structures, with WOFSs and JVs again higher than the mean, 
and POEs and SOEs lower (0.256 (0.005), 0.217 (0.017), –0.202 (0.027), and –0.237 (0.009), 
respectively).   
We also created a summary scale using the three financial performance measures.  For 
this summary scale, the values were significantly different by ownership type, and WOFSs were 
significantly higher than the others at the 0.002 level.  JVs were also higher than the mean, but 
not significantly so.  Likewise, SOEs and POEs were lower than the overall mean, but not 
significantly so.   
Regarding all the financial measures, we should note that privately owned firms might 
have an incentive to bias their responses on these financial questions.  SOEs, JVs and WOFSs 
are more closely monitored by the government, which would, one might hope, reduce the 
likelihood that they will misrepresent their financial results.  Privately owned firms, however, 
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may be a different story.  In general, reliable revenue and profit figures are known to be 
unavailable for Chinese firms.  The May 23, 2001 edition of China Reform News reported that 
92 percent of surveyed companies falsified certain financial data.  Are our financial measures to 
be trusted?  We think so for two reasons.  First, the relative results for the non-private firms are 
consistent with what one would expect, providing face value to the measurements.  Second, the 
survey on falsified data showed that the firms uniformly biased the data in one direction.  Since 
our conclusions are based on relative values, such a bias would not cause problems for between-
group comparisons based on order.   
 
4.  Results on Advanced Manufacturing Technologies 
One set of questions, which we designated by the shorthand “G”, asked about current status on 
sixteen manufacturing technologies, from quality circles and just-in-time (JIT) to automated 
assembly and robotics.  We asked respondents to score each technology with 1 if not 
implemented, 2 if implementation was in progress, and 3 if fully implemented.  See Table 3 for 
the full list of questions and results by ownership structure. 
In marked contrast to the results reported above, thirteen of the sixteen questions showed 
at least one ownership type significant at the 0.05 level.  In every case in which there was a 
significant result, the WOFS and JV firms had higher scores than the POE and SOE firms.  In 
fact, in thirteen of sixteen cases, the minimum of the WOFS and JV average scores was higher 
than the maximum of the POE and SOE average scores.  It would thus appear that foreign 
participation has a powerful impact on new technology implementation.  In fact, for this set of 
measures, the values were significantly different as a set for the different ownership types.   
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What about the differences between SOEs and POEs, and between WOFSs and JVs?  
Looking at the average scores for each of these questions, we find that POEs were lower than 
SOEs in the majority of cases (11 of 16), the same on some (3 of 16), and higher on the 
remainder (2 of 16).  Apparently, SOEs are more advanced than POEs in their implementation of 
new technologies.  Now comparing WOFSs and JVs using Table 3, note that WOFSs were 
higher than JVs for 7 of 16 cases and lower in the remainder, indicating that neither ownership 
structure is clearly ahead.   
One question in this set is Automation in Production (G2 in Table 3).  Average scores for 
SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs were 1.76, 1.55, 2.08 and 2.27, respectively. These are 
significantly different at the 0.000 level, with JVs and WOFSs clearly more advanced.  A 
question in another set asked about the proportion of automated manufacturing equipment in the 
factory.  Specifically, the question asked respondents to circle a number from 1 to 7 that reflects 
their firm’s current position, relative to competitors, with 7 being very high and 1 being very 
low.  The results for SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, were 3.82, 3.05, 5.21, and 5.08, respectively.  
These results are consistent with the current status question described here, but the differences 
are even more striking when the question is phrased this way.  These results are also significant 
at the 0.000 level.  A related question on the 7-point scale was the degree of specialization of 
production equipment.  The results for SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, were 5.32, 4.35, 5.83, and 
5.88, respectively.  These results are a bit more mixed, although the ownership structures are 
significantly different at the 0.001 level.  The reason for the slightly different ordering is that 
specialized production equipment may or may not be particularly high tech.  Finally, we asked 
the average number of years that production equipment has been used.  Not surprisingly, the 
results for SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, were 13.06, 8.55, 6.46, and 3.96 years, respectively.  
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SOEs are clearly using older, less high tech equipment; and as we shall see, they have less 
aggressive plans to replace this equipment with available, but expensive, new equipment. 
We asked a set of questions about future plans for advanced manufacturing technologies 
that directly parallels the “current status” ones.  Specifically, we asked respondents to score each 
technology with 1 if they have no plans for future investment, 2 if they are considering 
investment, and 3 if they have decided to make a future investment in the given technology.  See 
Table 4 for results.  Our shorthand for this set is “H”.   
For the H (future plans) questions, we find that far fewer items showed significant 
differences among ownership types than the G (current status) questions – only five of sixteen as 
opposed to thirteen of sixteen.  However, the values for the H measures were significantly 
different as a set for the different ownership types.  As with the G questions, for each significant 
individual item, WOFSs and JVs were above average, and POEs and SOEs were below average. 
In fact, just as in the G questions, in thirteen of sixteen questions, the minimum of the WOFS 
and JV average scores is higher than the maximum of the POE and SOE average scores, though 
not all significantly.  It would appear that, not only are WOFS and JV firms currently ahead, they 
also have more plans to implement these technologies in the future.  The sole exception is for 
plans for implementing ISO 9000 (H13). 
ISO 9000 Results 
For the ISO 9000 question, SOEs were significantly higher than the overall average while 
POEs were significantly lower.  These results are significant at the 0.028 level.  Average scores 
for SOE, POE, JV and WOFS are 2.64, 2.15, 2.33, and 2.58. These differences are not great, but 
they do suggest that more POEs and JVs are simply “considering” future investment toward ISO 
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certification, while more SOEs and WOFSs have decided to pursue it.  To put these results in 
context, the “current status” averages were 2.02, 1.55, 2.04, 2.00, respectively.   
One possible explanation for the ISO 9000 differences is the amount of production that is 
exported.  Many U.S. firms pursued ISO certification when the European Community announced 
that any firm selling to businesses in the EC must be ISO certified.  On the question regarding 
the percentage of production is exported, the averages were 21.08, 20.40, 41.08, and 57.23, for 
SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, respectively.  Not surprisingly, JVs and WOFSs export a 
significantly (at the 0.000 level) larger percentage of their output.  In the past decade or so, some 
SOEs obtained permission to retain a portion of the foreign currency earned.  Pyke (1998) notes 
that by 1992 Guangzhou Machine Tool Company’s segment of the machine tool market in China 
had been nearing the saturation point, so that exports had picked up a larger share of sales, 
reaching 50-60% of output.  The SOE average in our survey is 21%, but our results suggest that 
this number will increase significantly in the future, and that managers are preparing for that 
situation.  In addition, if only one large customer requires ISO certification, the firm must 
achieve it or give up that customer.   
These results may also suggest that, although SOEs and POEs currently have similar export 
percentages, SOEs may expect to export more in the future, and therefore are more aggressive in 
pursuing ISO certification.  Because the current export percentages are so close for SOEs and 
POEs, it is not correlated with ISO certification, either current status or future plans.  
Unfortunately, we do not know their future plans for export percentage.  One additional 
comment on these results: SOEs are clearly not lagging behind POEs in exports even though 
they have not achieved the export percentage found in JVs and WOFSs.   
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Finally, we were curious about the relationship between ISO certification and whether the 
firms design products for foreign markets.  (The design issue is captured in a 7-point scale 
question, where 7 is strongly agree with the statement: “We design products for foreign markets 
as well as domestic markets.”)  The results indicate that this question is significantly correlated 
with G13, ISO certification current status (0.182 at the 0.047 level), but not with H13, future 
plans, or with the percent of production exported.     
Quality Circles 
For the current status questions, WOFSs were higher than the overall mean on every question 
except G1 (Quality circles); and for G1 the means were very close to one another (2.37, 2.40, 
2.42, 2.38, for SOEs, POEs, JVs, and WOFSs, respectively).  Clearly, most firms have 
implemented quality circles, or are in the process of doing so, and there were no measurable 
differences among ownership types.  There were also no significant differences on future plans 
for quality circles, but the means all increased over the current status, to 2.52, 2.80, 2.63, 2.77, 
respectively.  These results indicate that most of those firms that have yet to implement quality 
circles have decided to invest resources on them in the future.  Interestingly, SOEs, which were 
lowest on current status, show the smallest average increase, although the magnitude of this 
increase is not significant.  We can conclude that SOE investment funds for new technologies in 
manufacturing, restricted as they are, will be spent on other initiatives and technologies. 
Current Status/Future Plans 
To further investigate the differences between current status and future plans, we looked at 
the differences on each technology, H1 – G1, and so on.  We denote these differences as HDIF 
values.  All sixteen values were positive, indicating that the future plans were on average larger 
than the corresponding current status.  For instance, a response of “2” on G5 means that 
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implementation of computer driven production planning system was in progress, while a “3” on 
H5 says that the firm had decided on future investment.  Positive differences are intuitive in the 
sense that future investment would finish the implementation, or in the sense that the firm was 
planning on adding to the implementation with more features, more complete rollout, and so on.  
Positive values are certainly to be expected; Chinese firms are not standing still.   
The lowest number of the HDIF values was question 10, robotics.  However, raw scores 
suggest that almost no firms had implemented robotics and almost no firms were planning to.  
The next lowest score was question 1, quality circles.  Here, the opposite is true: most firms had 
already implemented, or were currently implementing, as noted above.   
The highest score on HDIF was question 5, computer driven production planning system.  
The results are significant as seen in Table 5.  Average scores on the G question were 1.60, 1.60, 
2.08, and 1.96 for SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, respectively, while the H average scores were 
(from Table 4) 2.42, 2.00, 2.46, and 2.62, respectively.  POEs’ future plans are significantly 
lower than the others, but future plan averages are much larger than current status averages 
across the board.  Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRP II) systems are common examples 
of computer driven planning systems, and these are widely available on personal computers for 
reasonably sized applications.  Data requirements are not trivial, and implementation requires 
some real work, but the cost of the technology (hardware and software) is quite low.  It is not 
surprising that most firms are moving ahead with these systems.  An interesting supplement to 
these results is found in a question (C1) on the degree of computerization involved in production 
planning.  Specifically, the question asked respondents to circle a number from 1 to 7 that 
reflects their company’s current position, relative to competitors, with 7 being very high and 1 
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being very low.  The results for SOE, POE, JV and WOFS, respectively, were 3.50, 3.20, 5.21, 
and 5.04 (significant at the 0.000 level).  These are clearly consistent with the G question results.  
The second highest HDIF score is question 4, computer driven materials planning system.  
The G and H averages are quite similar to those of question 5, which is not surprising as the most 
common application of materials planning systems is MRPII, which generally comes bundled 
with production planning systems.  The key difference is that the materials planning modules in 
MRP systems can be used without problem in most factories, whereas the production planning 
modules apply best in only certain types of production processes.  A common mistake in 
implementing MRP systems is to apply the production planning and scheduling tools in, say, a 
job shop environment where queue times are quite long and variable.  MRP requires an input of 
the fixed lead time for a component at a given work center.  Variable queue times suggest that 
any choice of a lead time will be wrong, and therefore the MRP plan will often be in error.  On 
the other hand, the materials procurement module of the MRP system is quite robust.  It simply 
computes the number of parts and components necessary to assemble a given product and reports 
that number to the purchasing decision maker.  For both questions 4 and 5 on the HDIF scores, 
SOEs show a significantly larger increase (difference of H – G) than the group as a whole, while 
JVs show a significantly smaller increase (Table 5). 
Results on Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) are also interesting (question 15).  G scores 
were 1.30, 1.05, 1.38, and 1.50, for SOEs, POEs, JVs, and WOFSs, respectively, indicating that 
there is little use of EDI currently.  H scores were still low – 1.74, 1.60, 1,83, 1.88, respectively, 
indicating that, at most, firms are considering investment.  These results are not surprising given 
the cost and hassle of implementing EDI, both of which are magnified by the presence of the 
Internet where the same objectives can be accomplished with less cost, time and aggravation.   
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Scores for the questions on Statistical Process Control (SPC) were 1.74, 1.40, 2.08 and 2.15 
for current status for SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, respectively, and for future plans were 2.10, 
1.85, 2.21 and 2.42, respectively (Tables 3 and 4).  Apparently, implementation of SPC is 
ongoing at many companies, but future plans are not firm.  Rather, most companies are simply 
considering future investment.  Of course, these are averages, and the differences (H – G) are 
positive, but one does not get a sense of aggressive pursuit of SPC.  The one exception is 
WOFSs with a mean of 2.42.  Why are most firms hesitant about their plans for SPC?  Looking 
at the ISO 9000 scores for future plans, which are higher across the board than the SPC scores, 
we can infer that their efforts on quality management are more directed toward becoming ISO 
certified than implementing SPC.  ISO 9000 is a much more broad quality initiative, whereas 
SPC is a specific tool for product quality.  Perhaps the broader goal takes precedence, 
particularly given that foreign customers may require it.  They may implement SPC after ISO 
certification.  Another possibility is that they are in progress with implementation, and SPC 
really does not require further work after the current programs are completed.   
Low Scores 
There are a number of current status results (Table 3) where the averages for all firms were 
below 2.00, and two questions where three ownership types were below 2.00 and the fourth was 
barely above 2.00.  The technologies for which all were below 2.00 are group technology (GT, 
question G6), just-in-time (JIT, question G8), computer aided manufacturing (CAM, question 
G9), robotics (G10), flexible manufacturing systems (FMS, question G11), computer integrated 
manufacturing (CIM, question G14), EDI (G15), and automated assembly (G16).  We have 
discussed EDI previously, so we will not add to those comments.  The questions where all but 
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one ownership type were below 2.00 are computer driven production planning (G5) and 
computer aided design (CAD, question G7).  Some comments about these results follow. 
Group technology is a cellular manufacturing initiative that clusters products and 
components according to similarity of processing, thereby allowing a smaller set of machines to 
focus on similar components.  GT reduces setup times, often significantly.  These initiatives are 
not necessarily expensive in terms of hardware or software, but they do require substantial data 
gathering and analysis.  Furthermore, they require that the products and components produced by 
the firm be somewhat stable over time, or at least that the processing steps be somewhat stable.  
These comments suggest that perhaps GT should not be a key initiative for Chinese 
manufacturing firms at this time, and our results indicate that it is not. 
Just-in-time scores for current status were 1.77, 1.60, 1.75 and 1.92 for SOEs, POEs, JVs and 
WOFSs, respectively.  Scores for future plans were 1.98, 2.00, 2.21, and 2.38, respectively.  Low 
scores on this question are consistent with observations from Pyke et al. (2000) that the firms 
surveyed are somewhat behind the U.S. on supply chain issues.  However, compared with the 
other technologies for which current status means were below 2.00, the average scores on future 
plans for JIT were higher.  There are several possibilities for why this is true.  One is the 
presence of Japanese partners or other customers who often require JIT implementation.  
Another is the fact that although JIT requires substantial time and effort, it does not require large 
capital investments.  Yet by most accounts the return on the investment is clear.   
Current status mean scores for robotics were extremely low (1.00, 1.00, 1.21, and 1.19, for 
SOEs, POEs, JVs and WOFSs, respectively) indicating essentially no activity in this area.  These 
results are certainly consistent with common knowledge and our own observations.  Robotics are 
primarily used for two purposes – to save costs by replacing human labor in high volume 
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production environments, and to improve quality in repetitive manufacturing tasks.  Labor costs 
are very low in China, and there is often pressure not to lay off employees.  Therefore, the cost 
reduction motivation is rarely justified.  Furthermore, the skill level required to install and 
maintain robotics, and the capital investment necessary, is quite high.  Future plans mean scores 
on this question were also quite low (1.18, 1.20, 1.38 and 1.31 for SOEs, POEs, JVs and 
WOFSs, respectively), indicating that these firms do not plan to pursue robotics in the future.  
These results lend face validity to our study. 
Similar comments can be made about flexible manufacturing systems (FMS).  Scores on both 
current status and future plans were quite low, although not as low as for robotics.  One 
difference is that JVs and WOFSs were at least considering investing in FMS (average scores of 
2.08 for both on question H11).  Foreign participation may facilitate the potentially huge 
investment, although on average these firms were at most considering investment.  FMS have 
seen limited application, and limited success, in the U.S., although Japanese firms have generally 
been much more successful with them.  Hardware and software costs are extremely high, and the 
systems require highly skilled labor.  Very similar results are evident for CAM (G9), CIM (G14), 
and automated assembly (G16).  Likewise, the future plans numbers (H9, H14, and H16) reveal 
similar patterns.  See Tables 3 and 4.  The intuition behind the numbers follows the same logic as 
that for FMS.  Furthermore, some of these technologies build on others.  For instance, computer 
aided manufacturing (CAM) is typically implemented with or after computer aided design 
(CAD), and CIM is commonly considered to be the combination of CAD, CAM and automated 
materials handling.  It would clearly be unusual for firms to indicate an aggressive posture 
toward CIM without first, or concurrently, implementing CAD and CAM.   
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Now consider the results for computer aided design (CAD, G7 and H7).  Average scores 
indicate that many firms were in the process of implementing CAD, but not many had fully 
implemented it.  Average scores were 1.90, 1.45, 2.08 and 1.96, respectively, for current status, 
and were 2.31, 2.05, 2.33, and 2.46, respectively, for future plans.  These results reflect a much 
more aggressive posture toward future investment, in spite of the fact that current 
implementation is either non-existent or in progress.  Our own observations of machine tool and 
other manufacturing firms support these results.  We have seen CAD in operation at some firms 
and not at others.  CAD requires both software and hardware investment, to be sure; but the costs 
are coming down rapidly.  And the benefits, for quality improvement, cost reduction and new 
product introduction time, are quite clear.  Engineering graduates, particularly from top 
universities such as Tsinghua University in Beijing, may be trained on these systems.  
Furthermore, the systems are stand-alone in the sense that implementing CAD simply requires 
design engineers to be trained on a specific system.  The output is a design that will be passed on 
to manufacturing personnel who then produce to that design.  In contrast, implementing FMS or 
automated assembly requires a much larger investment in hardware and software and actually 
changes the tasks performed by a large number of production floor workers, engineers, 
maintenance personnel, quality inspectors, and so on. 
Size versus Ownership Structure 
As we analyzed these results, we debated whether the key issue in new technology adoption 
is company size rather than ownership structure.  Therefore, we tested the correlation between 
total number of employees and both sets of technology questions (G and H).  Of the 16 current 
status technology (G) questions, only three were significantly correlated with size: quality 
circles, robotics and ISO 9000.  And, of the 16 future plans technology questions, only one was 
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correlated with size: computer driven production planning system.  We have seen that the means 
across ownership types for quality circles and for ISO 9000 were very similar and that most 
firms were in the process of implementing, or had decided to implement.  The means for robotics 
were very similar, and quite low, for all firms on both sets of questions.  For computer driven 
production planning, the means were similar, but the difference between future plans and current 
status was much larger.  For all four cases, it would appear that, in spite of the explanatory 
power of ownership structure for many technology questions, size is a better independent 
variable.  Otherwise, ownership structure dominates as the explanatory variable. 
Ownership Structure, Technology Adoption and Financial Performance 
To summarize our results thus far, there are far fewer differences among ownership types 
than the popular and business press would have us believe.  However, financial performance 
measures do reveal several significant differences.  Furthermore, current technology adoption, 
and plans for the future, are significantly different in many cases.  As noted in Section 3, WOFSs 
perform better financially, with JVs also above the mean.  POEs and SOEs perform much worse.  
Similarly, WOFSs and JVs are much more advanced implementing many of the new 
technologies we surveyed than are POEs and SOEs.  These comments would suggest that 
financial performance is closely correlated with technology adoption.  Table 6 shows that this is 
indeed the case.  Ten of the sixteen current status technology questions are significantly 
positively correlated with the financial performance summary scale, and all sixteen signs are 
positive.  Fifteen of the sixteen future plans questions are significantly correlated with this 
summary scale.  All sixteen signs are positive, a pattern significant in a Sign Test at p < 0.01.  
Can we conclude that WOFSs perform better financially and they are more advanced 
technologically, or can we conclude that more technologically advanced firms perform better 
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financially?  To sort this out, we created a single summary index, TECH2, which is the sum of 
all the technology questions, including current status and future plans.  We also created a 
summary measure, WFS, that scores a 1 if the firm is a WOFS and a 0 otherwise.  Looking at the 
correlations between these two summary indices and financial performance, the partial 
correlation of the technology index is about twice as high as that of the ownership index (0.368 
at the 0.000 level for TECH2, and 0.164 at the 0.075 level for WFS).  Clearly, the technology 
index has greater explanatory power and is significant, while the ownership index is significant 
only at the 0.10 level.  In sum, WOFSs do in fact perform better financially, WOFSs are more 
advanced with new technology, and firms that are more advanced with new technology perform 
better financially.     
 
5.  Results on Improvement Actions 
Two sets of questions asked respondents about a number of improvement actions, again 
divided by current status (denoted the “E” set in our shorthand) and future plans (“F”).  As in the 
technology questions, we asked respondents to score each action with 1 if not implemented, 2 if 
implementation was in progress, and 3 if fully implemented, for the current status set.  Likewise, 
for future plans, 1 means they have no plans for future investment, 2 means they are considering 
investment, and 3 means they have decided to make a future investment in the given action.  See 
Tables 7 and 8 for the full list of questions and results by ownership structure.  Eight actions 
listed pertain to labour issues, two to supply chain, four to production cost and processes, one to 
delivery, one to quality, and three to flexibility. For both the E and F sets of measures, the values 
were significantly different as a set for the different ownership types.     
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We now discuss the difference between the mean by ownership structure and the overall 
mean for specific questions where we observe significant differences.  First, for “Give workers a 
broader range of tasks” (E1), POEs were significantly lower than the overall mean (-0.206, at the 
0.024 level).  SOEs and WOFSs were higher than the mean, while JVs were lower, but none of 
these latter three are significant at the 0.10 level.  The fact that SOEs were higher is consistent 
with their well-known strategy of reducing the number of workers.  In fact, for the question on 
reducing the workforce size (E15), SOEs were significantly higher than the mean (0.346, at the 
0.000 level).  The average score for SOEs on these two questions was 2.08 and 2.34, 
respectively.  In other words, SOEs are currently reducing workforce size and at the same time 
are giving the remaining workers more tasks.  As might be expected SOEs are decidedly 
planning on continuing these two trends.  The means for future plans for giving workers a 
broader range of tasks and reducing workforce size (F1 and F15) for SOEs were 2.70 and 2.76, 
respectively.  These results again show the face validity of the overall results, and they confirm 
widely reported workforce reductions in SOEs. 
The above results are consistent with the summary scales pertaining to the operations 
objectives.  Several of the questions asked about factory flexibility, both “emphasis during the 
past year” and “degree of improvement in the past year.”  SOEs were higher than the other firms 
on both of these, although the results were significant only at the 0.134 and 0.120 levels 
respectively.  A desire to increase flexibility may be driving SOEs to broader worker tasks.   
To fill out this discussion, consider the SOE scores on all the operations objectives summary 
scales.  SOEs seem to place strong emphasis on all the objectives – cost, quality, delivery and 
flexibility.  However, the highest scores for “past year emphasis” were for quality, delivery and 
cost, in that order.  Factory flexibility, while higher than the other firms, was still lower than the 
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other three.  SOEs lowest score for “degree of improvement” was for the cost summary scale, 
revealing perhaps that cost reduction measures, such as workforce reduction, have not proceeded 
at the desired pace.  Furthermore, a strong emphasis on all objectives might suggest a lack of 
focus, which itself might be a key driver of poor financial performance. 
Like SOEs, WOFSs are currently working on giving workers a broader range of tasks (E1) as 
evidenced by the mean score of 2.12.  However, unlike SOEs, in this case the motivation is not a 
reduction in workforce size.  The WOFS score on E15 (reduce workforce size) was 1.50.  In 
other words, most of these firms are not reducing the number of workers at all.  Regarding plans 
for the future, WOFSs plan to continue broadening worker activities (the mean on F1 was 2.50), 
and they do not plan to reduce the number of workers (1.92 on F15).  Clearly these firms are not 
burdened with the holdover from the iron rice bowl. 
Table 9 contains results by ownership structure for all the questions from the survey that 
pertain to workforce issues. There is no clear pattern across all these results, and some of the 
results appear mixed.  For instance, one might conclude from C11, C12 and C13 that POEs give 
more responsibility to their workers.  POEs appear to assign more improvement responsibility to 
workers (C11), cross train them (C12), and consult them in deciding production schedules (C13).  
However, this conclusion is not supported by their low scores on E1 and F1 (broader range of 
tasks), E3 and F3 (changing the labour/management relationship), E4 and F4 (motivate workers), 
or even on E10 and F10 (increase supervisor training).  In other words, they do not appear to 
have invested in giving more responsibility, or in training or motivating workers or supervisors; 
and they appear to have less aggressive plans for the future than other firms.  Yet, they have 
provided some cross training and do consult their workers more than others on production 
scheduling issues.  Similar comments can be made about JVs.  Responses for JVs on C3 (level of 
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training given to workers), C8 (worker skill) and G1 (quality circles) suggest more training and 
skill.  Yet JVs scored lowest on F2 (giving workers more planning responsibility), F3 (changing 
the labour/management relationship) and F4 (motivating workers).   One final comment: the 
future plans (F) scores on workforce issues (Table 9) were fairly high across the board, 
indicating that worker responsibility and motivation are important areas of interest for all firms.   
A fascinating result pertains to shifting manufacturing operations to lower cost regions (E6 
and F6).   SOEs, POEs and JVs all had means around 2.00 (implementation in progress).  The 
mean for WOFSs was 1.65, indicating less current emphasis on this shift.  One might wonder 
why these firms would consider shifting to lower cost regions when they already operate in a low 
cost country.  Are they thinking of moving offshore?  Probably not, although Vietnam, Thailand 
and Indonesia could offer lower cost opportunities.  It is more likely that they are considering 
taking advantage of tax incentives to move further into the interior regions of China.  WOFSs are 
relatively new and are more likely to be comfortable with their choice of location and the 
associated wage rates, having made the location decision more recently.  Also, it is unlikely that 
they will find expatriates who will be interested in moving away from the Shanghai area, 
particularly to the interior of China.  Differences among ownership types on future plans to shift 
production to low cost regions are, however, significant.  Mean scores for SOEs, POEs, JVs and 
WOFSs were 2.62 , 2.60, 2.50, and 2.00, respectively.  The SOE mean score is significantly 
higher than the overall mean, while the WOFS mean score is significantly lower (0.187 (0.040 
level), and –0.331 (0.000 level), respectively).  In general, it seems clear that SOEs and POEs are 
more likely to move operations than JVs or WOFSs.  
One further result on technology and improvement actions is found in a question on 
developing new processes for old products (E7 and F7).  Results for current status for SOEs, 
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POEs, JVs and WOFSs, were 2.04, 2.00, 1.58, and 1.73, respectively.  These numbers are not 
particularly surprising because JVs and WOFSs are generally newer enterprises without the 
burden of old processes.  However, they do indicate that SOEs are in the process of improving 
production processes.  The mean values for the same question with regard to plans for the future 
were 2.46, 2.60, 2.17, and 2.38, respectively.  Plans for the future, across ownership types, are 
more aggressive than current implementation, with some significant proportion of firms having 
decided to pursue new processes.  However, JVs and WOFSs show less inclination for this 
initiative. 
Improvement Actions and Financial Performance 
We now examine the relationship between the improvement actions (E & F) and the financial 
summary scale.  For the current status questions (E), eighteen of the nineteen questions have 
positive signs, and eleven are significant.  See Table 10 for results.  Six of the questions pertain 
to assigning more responsibility to workers, training workers and supervisors, and increasing 
motivation (questions 1,2, 3, 4, 10 and13).  For the current status version of these six questions, 
five are significantly correlated with the financial summary scale.  Workforce issues are clearly 
critical, even in a country with relatively low-cost labour. 
The other items that are significant on the current status set are “Introduce new products,” 
“Reduce production lead time,” “Reduce time to adjust machines in response to producing 
different customer orders,” “Modify the functions of existing products,” “Increase production 
capacity,” and “Reduce production cost.”  It would be difficult to draw firm conclusions from the 
significant result on these five questions.  However, it is interesting to note that several pertain to 
flexibility for new product introduction and for existing products and customers, several pertain 
to delivery lead times (including the one on increasing production capacity), and at least one 
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pertains to production cost. (The question on production capacity may relate to production cost, 
depending on the rationale for increasing capacity).  What is striking about these results is that 
three of the four operations objectives (cost, delivery and flexibility) are significantly correlated 
with financial performance, and the fourth, quality, was represented explicitly by only one item 
in this set of questions.  In other words, it is not possible to conclude that firms pursuing a 
particular objective are more likely to perform better financially.  Rather, one observes support 
for the notion of “equifinality” – that there are multiple strategies that can lead to superior 
performance in a given industry or market niche.  In addition, there is some evidence that fit and 
consistency may be more important than direction  (Smith & Reece (1999) and Boyer & 
McDermott (1999)).   
For the future plans questions (F), six of nineteen are significant at the 0.05 level (eight at the 
0.10 level), and seventeen signs are positive.  The questions with significant correlations are 3, 4, 
5, 10, 11 and 13.  All of these but question 11 relate to workforce issues.   The question about 
worker safety (F5) is significant for future plans, but not for current status.  However, questions 
F1 and F2 (broader range of tasks and more planning responsibility) are not significant for future 
plans, but are for current status.  While the results are not completely consistent, we can 
conclude in general that high scores on current status and future plans for worker relationship, 
motivation and training are positively correlated with financial performance.  Interestingly two 
correlations, F6 and F15 (“shift operations to low cost regions,” and “reduce workforce size”), 
are negative.  Because SOEs score significantly higher on these questions, however, it seems 
clear that it is not the fact of planning to shift operations or reduce workforce size that reduces 
financial performance.  Rather, SOEs perform worse financially, and these are the very firms that 
score high on these questions. 
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Finally, we address the same question of the improvement actions that we did of the 
technology questions:  is the key driver size, rather than ownership structure?  As it happens, the 
answer is very similar.  None of the current status questions are correlated with size (number of 
total employees), and only one of the future plans questions is.  The one significant result was F6 
– shifting operations to low cost regions.  Again, it seems clear that ownership structure is a 
much more important explanatory variable than size for these improvement action questions.   
 
6.  Conclusions and Discussion 
We have analyzed results from a survey of 120 manufacturing firms in the Shanghai 
region.  Focusing on four ownership structures – state-owned enterprises (SOEs), privately 
owned enterprises (POEs), joint ventures (JVs) and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (WOFSs) 
– we discovered that for the majority of questions, there are few significant differences.  For 
manufacturing technologies, however, we found otherwise.  In particular, WOFSs and JVs are 
clearly more advanced, and are planning further investment, while SOEs and POEs are lagging 
behind.  WOFSs show significantly more improvement in financial performance, while JVs are 
above average and SOEs and POEs below average.  We also examined whether firm size is a 
more powerful explanatory variable than ownership structure and discovered that it is not.  
Finally, broadly speaking we determined that firms that emphasize workforce training, 
responsibility and motivation show better improvement in profitability. 
Our results confirm many commonly held insights about state-owned enterprises, but 
they also reveal that the many assumed differences among ownership types might not be as great 
as the business press would suggest.  A further study on these issues would be interesting, 
particularly given the many changes that are happening in China.  Are SOEs progressing more 
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rapidly now?  Have they been able to pursue some of the new technologies?  What sort of 
survivorship bias can we detect?  What about other ownership structures? These and other 
questions could form the basis of fascinating research. 
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Product Line/Industry Number of Firms 
in the Sample 
Consumer goods  
    Durable consumer goods 17 
    Non-durable consumer goods 44 
Goods for industrial / commercial / government uses  
    Manufacturing equipment (capital goods) 15 
    Raw materials or half-finished products 10 
    Parts / components for assembling 24 
    Supplies and other consumption goods 10 
 










(Cronbach ∝ ) 
Competitive Quality Objectives 3 Emphasis on improving product reliability, 
improving quality consistency, good after-
sale service 
0.63 
    
Improvement in Quality Performance 4 Improved product reliability, improving 
quality consistency, good after-sale service, 
increasing product durability 
0.75 
    
Competitive Delivery Objectives 3 Emphasis on time for completion, delivery 
and meeting due dates 
0.64 
    
Improvement in Delivery 3 Improved time for completion, delivery and 
meeting due dates 
0.86 
    
Competitive New Product Flexibility 
Objectives 
3 Emphasis on reducing time to introduction, 
adding functions, introducing more products 
0.65 
    
Improvement in New Product 
Flexibility 
3 Improvement in time to introduction, adding 
functions and new product introductions 
0.72 
    
Competitive Factory Flexibility 
Objectives 
2 Emphasis on ability to change product 
volume and product mix 
0.28 
    
Improvement in Factory Flexibility 2 Improvement in ability to change product 
volume and product mix 
0.61 
    
Improvement in Performance 3 Improved market share, profitability and 
return on sales 
0.83 
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Item Question   SOE POE JV WOFS 
1 Quality circles Pearson Correlation -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.09
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.25 0.37 0.71 0.35
2 Automation in production Pearson Correlation 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.07
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.77 0.51 0.84 0.45
3 Computerization in administration (office automation) Pearson Correlation 0.05 0.10 -0.13 -0.03
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.57 0.26 0.16 0.73
4 Computer driven materials planning system Pearson Correlation 0.29* -0.11 -0.29* 0.03
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.74
5 Computer driven production planning system Pearson Correlation 0.23* -0.14 -0.18* 0.02
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.82
6 Group technology Pearson Correlation 0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.07
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.33 0.61 0.95 0.45
7 CAD (Computer aided design) Pearson Correlation -0.04 0.12 -0.12 0.06
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.67 0.21 0.18 0.51
8
JIT (Producing parts only when products are 
needed) Pearson Correlation -0.17 0.03 0.08 0.09
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.08 0.72 0.39 0.35
9 CAM (Computer aided manufacturing) Pearson Correlation -0.05 0.14 -0.10 0.04
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.59 0.14 0.28 0.69
10 Robotics Pearson Correlation 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.06
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.80 0.73 1.00 0.53
11 FMS (Flexible manufacturing systems) Pearson Correlation -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.09
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.81 0.76 0.67 0.33
12 Statistical Process Control (SPC) Pearson Correlation 0.07 0.09 -0.14 -0.03
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.48 0.30 0.14 0.74
13 ISO 9000 Pearson Correlation 0.08 0.03 -0.16 0.02
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.36 0.72 0.08 0.80
14 Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM ) Pearson Correlation -0.18 0.07 0.10 0.05
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.06 0.44 0.27 0.62
15 Electronic Data Interchange ( EDI ) Pearson Correlation -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.06
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.88 0.42 0.94 0.54
16 Automated assembly  Pearson Correlation -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.02
    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.34 0.56 0.67 0.86
 
Table 5: Differences between Future Technology Plans 
and Current Status:  Difference of (H – G) values from 










1 Quality circles Pearson Correlation 0.03 0.18* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.74 0.04 
2 Automation in production Pearson Correlation 0.09 0.22* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.32 0.02 
3 Computerization in administration (office automation) Pearson Correlation 0.34* 0.36* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 
4 Computer driven materials planning system Pearson Correlation 0.34* 0.33* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 
5 Computer driven production planning system Pearson Correlation 0.33* 0.31* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 
6 Group technology Pearson Correlation 0.22* 0.24* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.01 
7 CAD (Computer aided design) Pearson Correlation 0.20* 0.26* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 0.00 
8 JIT (Producing parts only when products are needed) Pearson Correlation 0.14 0.27* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.12 0.00 
9 CAM (Computer aided manufacturing) Pearson Correlation 0.22* 0.27* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.00 
10 Robotics Pearson Correlation 0.19* 0.22* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.04 0.01 
11 FMS (Flexible manufacturing systems) Pearson Correlation 0.13 0.18* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.15 0.05 
12 Statistical Process Control (SPC) Pearson Correlation 0.29* 0.31* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.00 
13 ISO 9000 Pearson Correlation 0.29* 0.22* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.02 
14 Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM ) Pearson Correlation 0.24* 0.30* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.00 
15 Electronic Data Interchange ( EDI ) Pearson Correlation 0.14 0.19* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.12 0.04 
16 Automated assembly  Pearson Correlation 0.06 0.10 
    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.54 0.28 
 
Table 6: Correlations between Technology Questions 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Item / Question SOE POE JV WOFS Scale Signif. 
C3 Level of training given to workers 4.26 3.95 5.00 4.50 7 = high No  
C8 The workers’ skills at doing their 
jobs 
5.38 4.85 5.75 5.54 7 = high 0.04 
C11 Our workers have no role in 
helping to improve the manufacturing 
process 
2.42 2.25 2.83 2.31 7 = strongly 
agree 
No 
C12 Our workers are trained to manage 
different stages of the production 
process 
5.82 6.05 5.12 6.46 7 = strongly 
agree 
0.01 
C13 Our workers are consulted in 
deciding the production schedule 




J6 Degree to which Supervisors 
understand the objectives and plans of 
the manufacturing strategy of your 
company 
4.58 4.95 4.75 5.31 7 = fully 
understand 
No 
J7 Degree to which Leading Hands 
understand the objectives and plans of 
the manufacturing strategy of your 
company 
3.80 3.80 3.96 4.08 7 = fully 
understand 
No 
J7 Degree to which Workers/Operators 
understand the objectives and plans of 
the manufacturing strategy of your 
company 
3.48 3.40 3.63 3.54 7 = fully 
understand 
No 
E1 Give workers a broader range of 
tasks 
2.08 1.70 1.83 2.12 See Table 6 0.04 
E2 Give workers more planning 
responsibility 
1.60 1.65 1.67 1.65  No 
E3 Changing the labour/management 
relationship 
2.18 2.10 2.17 2.31  No 
E4 Motivate workers 2.16 2.00 2.08 2.23  No 
E5 Improve worker safety 2.60 2.55 2.54 2.65  No 
E10 Increase supervisor training 2.10 2.30 2.58 2.27  0.05 
E15 Reduce workforce size 2.34 2.00 1.96 1.50  0.00 
F1 Give workers a broader range of 
tasks 
2.70 2.05 2.29 2.50 See Table 7 0.00 
F2 Give workers more planning 
responsibility 
2.24 2.10 1.96 2.35  No 
F3 Changing the labour/management 
relationship 
2.82 2.70 2.46 2.85  0.03 
F4 Motivate workers 2.80 2.70 2.67 2.92  No 
F5 Improve worker safety 2.82 2.90 2.79 2.77  No 
F10 Increase supervisor training 2.82 2.80 2.88 2.81  No 
F15 Reduce workforce size 2.76 2.45 2.50 1.92  0.00 
G1 Quality circles 2.37 2.40 2.42 2.38 See Table 2 No 
H1 Quality circles 2.52 2.80 2.63 2.77 See Table 3 No 
K12 Number of operators/workers 
currently 
799.94 138.65 312.08 285.62  0.01 
K13 Number of total employees 
currently 
1322.10 249.85 608.50 564.42  0.01 
K14 Number of total employees five 
years ago 
2094.80 248.30 320.04 335.88  0.00 
 
Table 9: Workforce Issues 
 





1 Give workers a broader range of tasks Pearson Correlation 0.12 0.11 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.21 0.23 
2 Give workers more planning responsibility Pearson Correlation 0.21* 0.13 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.15 
3 Changing the labour/management relationship Pearson Correlation 0.21* 0.23* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.01 
4 Motivate workers Pearson Correlation 0.43* 0.25* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.01 
5 Improve worker safety Pearson Correlation 0.13 0.20* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.15 0.03 
6 Shift manufacturing operations to low cost regions Pearson Correlation 0.01 -0.13 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.87 0.15 
7 Develop new processes for old products Pearson Correlation 0.04 0.03 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.69 0.72 
8 Introduce more new products Pearson Correlation 0.25* 0.11 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.24 
9 Reduce production lead time  Pearson Correlation 0.19* 0.12 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.04 0.20 
10 Increase supervisor training Pearson Correlation 0.23* 0.24* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.01 
11 Monitor the quality of materials from suppliers Pearson Correlation 0.11 0.25* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.25 0.01 
12 
Reduce the time to adjust machines in response to 
producing different customer orders Pearson Correlation 0.22* 0.14 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.12 
13 Introduce more worker training Pearson Correlation 0.31* 0.23* 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.00 0.01 
14 Modify the functions of existing products Pearson Correlation 0.21* 0.17 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 0.06 
15 Reduce  workforce size Pearson Correlation -0.11 -0.06 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.24 0.55 
16 Increase production capacity Pearson Correlation 0.19* 0.08 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 0.39 
17 Reduce production cost Pearson Correlation 0.25* 0.17 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.01 0.07 
18 Improve relationships with suppliers Pearson Correlation 0.09 0.10 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.32 0.30 
19 Improve relationships with customers Pearson Correlation 0.08 0.09 
    Sig. (2-tailed) 0.37 0.33 
 
 
Table 10: Correlations between Improvement Action Questions and the Financial Performance 
Summary Scale (*p = 0.05) 
 
